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Implications of globalisation for ﬁ  nancial stability
On 4 November 2005, the Banque de France held its biennial symposium, devoted to the topic of 
“Productivity, competitiveness and globalisation”. Some 20 speakers from central banks, international 
organisations, universities and the private sector contributed to the discussions, with the presence and 
participation of around 200 representatives of these different spheres of activity.
The symposium was comprised of three sessions, followed by a round table. The former considered recent 
trends in productivity and competitiveness, their impact on international capital allocation, and economic 
policy responses and their resulting spontaneous adjustments. 
The roundtable, chaired by Roger Ferguson, Vice Chairman of the Board of Governors of the US Federal 
Reserve System and Chairman of the Financial Stability Forum until April 2006, brought the symposium 
to a close on a more ﬁ  nancial note. The prevention and management of ﬁ  nancial crises in both emerging 
and industrialised countries were discussed by the following ﬁ  ve panellists: Zeti Akhtar Aziz, Governor 
of Bank Negara Malaysia, David Dodge, Governor of the Bank of Canada, Jacob A. Frenkel, Chairman of the
Group of Thirty, Toshihiko Fukui, Governor of the Bank of Japan and Yaga Venugopal Reddy, Governor 
of the Reserve Bank of India.
Particular focus was placed on the optimum level of regulation required in order to beneﬁ  t from the signiﬁ  cant 
increase in capital ﬂ  ows while limiting the repercussions of overly sharp reactions by the markets. Also 
discussed was the need for an all-encompassing approach to adjusting global imbalances, combining all 
the levers: global demand, prices, and exchange rates.
The papers presented during the round table and the three preceding sessions are available on-line
at www.banque-france.fr (Publications and Research, Proceedings of Seminars and Symposiums). 
To give an insight into the views expressed during the roundtable discussions, Roger Ferguson’s introduction 
and Jacob A. Frenkel’s concluding remarks are being published in this issue of the Banque de France’s 
Financial Stability Review. Roger Ferguson highlights four factors that contribute to exacerbating ﬁ  nancial 
risks relating to globalisation: the emergence of major ﬁ  nancial crises in emerging-market economies; a more 
complex institutional backdrop, as illustrated by the growth in hedge funds; the uncertainties surrounding some
of the risk bearers of last resort, i.e. reinsurers and households; and the appearance of new ﬁ  nancial 
products, whose impact in times of crisis is still unknown. Jacob A. Frenkel points out the increasing 
emphasis placed on ﬁ  nancial stability issues and debates the risks of over-regulating, calling for a reopening 
of discussions on capital account convertibility.ARTICLES
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1| SPEECH BY ROGER FERGUSON
Let me introduce the next panel by using an outline 
from my old days in the private sector. At McKinsey, 
we used to organise the discussions around the 
following topics: the situation, the complication, and 
then the solution. 
As for the situation, a “Paris Consensus” seems to have 
emerged. We all recognise that the global imbalances 
are unsustainable in the literal sense of the word 
and that they will not go on forever. There is no 
ﬁ  nal agreement on the causes of these imbalances, 
but a number of candidates have emerged –such 
as productivity differentials across economies and 
relative growth rates– and I think that all of us can 
ﬁ  nd some comfort in one of those explanations.   
Finally, part of the “Paris Consensus” is that the 
possibility of the global imbalances unwinding in 
an orderly way has not been discounted, but yet a 
concern that the unwinding might be disorderly, a 
so-called hard landing in the ways that we have all 
talked about, is clear among those in this room. 
I would like to add a bit to the “Paris Consensus” 
and, at the same time, highlight some work done 
by colleagues at the Federal Reserve. In a recent 
paper entitled “Currency crashes and bond yields 
in industrial countries”, Joseph Gagnon examined 
twenty-six incidents of currency crashes across the 
globe in the past twenty years. He found that, since 
1985, these so-called currency crashes have actually 
not been terribly disruptive; they have not led to a 
dramatic increase in interest rates, for example, or 
to a dramatic deceleration of growth in industrial 
economies. Another paper by Federal Reserve 
economists is “Financial market developments and 
economic activity during current account adjustments 
in industrial economies”. The authors, Hilary Croke, 
Steven B. Kamin, and Sylvain Leduc, found little 
evidence that shrinking current account deﬁ  cits, at 
least in industrial countries, are accompanied by 
sharply weaker currencies and recessions. Hence, 
some reasons for cautious optimism can be found
in such work by Fed staff members.
So that is the situation, the “Paris Consensus”, as 
I see it. The complication is in the topic that we 
want to discuss now. As Christian Noyer said at 
the opening, these conversations need to consider 
the question of ﬁ   nancial stability. The ﬁ  rst 
complicating factor is that during this recent period 
of great productivity and globalisation, we have 
seen ﬁ  nancial instability crises, such as occurred 
in 1997 and 1998, arising from the emerging-market
economies. Those crises indicated that rapid 
movements of capital, which have been helpful 
to the United States, could be detrimental to 
economies with weak policy or institutional 
frameworks. The instabilities emanating from 
the emerging markets in turn created the
risk of a negative impact on the United States. 
We have also seen the more surprising story of 
Japan, to which I think Otmar Issing alluded, which 
illustrates the possibility of instability arising in an 
industrial economy. 
The second complication in this world
of globalisation and high productivity is that the 
institutional  backdrop has become more complex 
over the past twenty years. One example is the 
hedge fund industry, which was earlier alluded 
to with the mention of LTCM –Long-Term Capital 
Management–. We now have a hedge fund industry 
that is about one trillion dollars in size. To some 
people, this industry is relatively opaque; others 
have greater conﬁ  dence in it but still ﬁ  nd it to 
be large. According to hedge fund industry data, 
about 8,500 funds exist right now. The average size 
of a hedge fund is about USD 120 million, which 
is the size of a small to medium-sized bank in the
United States. Therefore, no single hedge fund is 
likely to be systemically important. But even a 
fragmented industry has risks of “herding” behaviours 
and of high correlations across members’ strategies. 
Also, even though the average hedge fund is not 
large, the concentration of assets in the industry is 
another complexity. Clearly, institutional changes 
are an issue.
A third complexity is that the risk bearers of last 
resort fall into two categories. The ﬁ  rst ones are 
institutional, in the form of insurers or re-insurers. 
The re-insurers, like hedge funds, may be a bit 
opaque to some in the public sector. The number 
of re-insurers is small, and the institutions are
well-regulated, but the composition of their balance 
sheets and their risk exposures are, for many 
observers, not clear. The other shock absorber of 
last resort is the household sector. There is some 
concern, expressed by some people in this room, 
about the leverage that exists on households’ balance 
sheets and the degree to which households are 
relying on accommodative interest rates.ARTICLES
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The fourth complexity, as we consider these global 
imbalances and their possible unwinding, is that a 
number of new products have emerged over the past 
twenty years. The credit default swap market has 
become signiﬁ  cant as a way to transfer risk to the 
balance sheets of those who think they can best bear 
that risk. This development must be considered to be 
positive. However, some observers have expressed 
concern that many of these new products have 
not been tested during severe stress. The credit 
default market was tested in the United States when 
General Motors and Ford were downgraded. The 
market worked well, but as a test the downgrade 
was limited. More-exotic products have also 
emerged during the past few years –for example,
interest-only mortgages, negative amortisation 
mortgages, and option adjustable rate mortgages. 
These products have not been tested under the kind 
of rapid changes in macroeconomic circumstances 
and of interest rates that could follow from a rapid 
adjustment of the imbalances.
These considerations all lead to this important and 
distinguished panel. I would put before them just
three questions. First, in general, can the current 
policies, or others that we can reasonably implement, 
increase both macroeconomic and ﬁ  nancial stability? 
Second, as a result of institutional and policy 
changes since the late 1990’s, are the emerging 
economies better positioned than they were to 
withstand whatever changes may occur as part of the 
inevitable adjustment of these various imbalances? 
My third question has two parts: Have the
risk-management skills of these newer institutions 
and their counterparties evolved sufﬁ  ciently, and are 
the institutions prepared to deal with the adjustments 
that are likely to be a part of the unwinding of various 
imbalances we have discussed?
We have an excellent panel to look at the issues 
discussed today and perhaps answer these 
questions. From the industrial economies we have 
Governor Dodge from the Bank of Canada and 
Governor Fukui from the Bank of Japan. From the 
emerging economies, we have two distinguished 
policymakers as well: Y.V. Reddy from the
Reserve Bank of India and Zeti Akhtar Aziz from 
Bank Negara Malaysia. Finally, Jacob Frenkel in 
the recent past was a distinguished policymaker 
and is the current chair of the Group of Thirty,
which brings together policymakers and individuals 
from the private sector. So I would hope that he can 
give us a little bit of both perspectives.
2| SPEECH BY JACOB A. FRENKEL
The theme of this conference has been: “Global 
Imbalances, Financial Stability, and Productivity”. 
Those issues are central to the understanding of 
the operation of the international economic and 
ﬁ  nancial systems. They are extremely timely, at the 
present junction of the world economy. Occasional 
observation of the global economic scene over the 
past twenty years reveals that the very same issues 
have occupied policy makers throughout the period 
but yet the world has undergone fundamental 
changes during the past twenty years and, as a result, 
the implications of imbalances, ﬁ  nancial stability, 
and productivity are different today than what they 
were in the past. 
The interdependence among economies reﬂ  ects 
the globalisation of the economic scene. Economic 
policies in one country have their impact on 
others. This has been the fundamental raison d’être 
underlying the concept of international policy 
coordination which has gained special prominence 
in the second part of the 1980’s. In 1985, at the
Plaza Accord, the entire focus of policy coordination 
was reﬂ  ected in exchange rate adjustments. The value 
of the dollar was reduced through policy coordination. 
Shortly thereafter at the Louvre Accord in 1987, the 
coordination of economic policies was expended to 
include a broader range of macroeconomic policies 
in particular ﬁ  scal policies. The focus at that time 
was on budget deﬁ  cits and external imbalances. The 
challenge was how to reduce the large surpluses
of Japan and West Germany, which at the time were 
the “locomotives” of the world economy, while at 
the same time reduce the large deﬁ  cits of the US.
Of course, times have changed. West Germany has 
been uniﬁ  ed with East Germany and has slowed down 
signiﬁ  cantly while suffering from large budgetary 
burdens, and Japan has gone through the worst 
decade in its modern economic history, suffering 
from a prolonged recession and ever-expanding 
budget deﬁ  cits and government debt. 
The world economic system has changed 
dramatically. Capital markets have become much 
more integrated, and various economic crises have 
been intimately linked to the vulnerabilities of 
ﬁ  nancial markets. LTCM, Enron, the Asian ﬁ  nancial 
crisis, the Russian ﬁ  nancial crisis, to mention a few, 
have all been manifestations of the new breed of the 
international ﬁ  nancial system reﬂ  ecting elements 
that were not as prominent even twenty years ago. ARTICLES
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Not only has the nature of the markets changed, but 
also the main players in the global economic scene. 
Enough is to mention the growing role of Asia and in 
particular the rising prominence of China and India 
in the global scene. Against this background it is 
relevant to note that even though the range of issues 
addressed in this conference and, in particular, the 
challenge posed by the large global imbalances, are 
similar to the issues addressed twenty years ago but, 
that similarity is only apparent. The new nature of 
capital markets makes the challenge at the present 
juncture very different from the one in the past. 
In order to appreciate the nature of the challenge, it 
is enough to recall that the US has been running a 
current account deﬁ  cit of about 800 billion US dollars
during  2005 which comprises about 6.5% of 
its GDP. That deﬁ  cit has been growing steadily 
during the past few years and if it was not for the 
extraordinary appetite of a few central banks in Asia 
for the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves, 
the strains on the world capital markets induced 
by the large deﬁ  cit would have been very severe.
At the present time, China and Japan alone are 
holding about 1.7 trillion US dollars worth of 
international reserves; where China alone has 
accumulated over 400 billion US dollars just in 
the past two years. There is a growing consensus 
that such accumulation is unlikely to continue 
indeﬁ  nitely; after all, trees do not grow to the 
sky. While the United States has been running a 
current account deﬁ  cit in excess of about 800 billion 
US dollars during 2005, other economies have run 
signiﬁ  cant surpluses. In this regard, Asia’s surplus 
has exceeded 300 billion US dollars, whereas the 
surplus of the Middle East oil exporters plus that
of Russia has also reached about 300 billion US dollars. 
This massive change of the distribution of wealth 
reﬂ  ects a source of signiﬁ  cant vulnerability. 
While much of the focus in the public debate has 
been given to the large and growing imbalances in 
the current accounts of the balance of payments, 
the world economic system is challenged by many 
more imbalances including large budget deﬁ  cits 
which reached in 2005 about 2.6 percent of GDP in 
the US and in the Eurozone and it reached about 
6.5 percent of GDP in Japan. In addition, the large 
imbalances in the balance of trade and, in particular, 
the deteriorating trade balance of the United States 
threatens the emergence of extremely dangerous 
protectionist sentiments. 
The most fundamental imbalance in the world 
economy relates to the saving propensities among 
the major countries. On the one extreme, the 
United States has a very low savings rate which 
is about 10 percent of GDP in 2005 while on the 
other extreme stands China with a very high savings 
rate reaching about 50 percent of its GDP. Between 
these two extremes stand India and Japan with 
national savings rates of about 25 percent, and the 
Eurozone with a savings rate of about 20 percent.
Obviously, with such great diversity among national 
savings rates it is no wonder that the current 
accounts of the various countries reveal such a 
degree of imbalance. 
In addition to these budgetary and current account 
imbalances, there are many other “imbalances” and 
disparities that characterize the world economic 
system. In this regard, it is enough to recall the 
imbalances in the energy ﬁ  eld, in the pension 
system, in the degree of income inequality, in 
the different degrees of ﬂ  exibility of national 
labor markets, in the demographic characteristics 
of various countries and regions in the world, 
in the social security system and the like. This 
wide range of imbalances implies that in order to 
address them there is a need to employ a broad 
array of policy instruments. These policies include 
macroeconomic as well as microeconomic policies. 
In particular, special attention should be given to 
strengthening the banking system, improving the 
functioning of ﬁ  nancial markets including the 
market for foreign exchange, while accompanying 
these developments with the appropriate 
supervisory and regulatory mechanisms. In 
addition, policies must secure the openness of 
the various markets to free international trade in 
goods, services, and capital. Of course, this is a 
very tall order of economic policy challenges as it 
combines the broad array of macroeconomic and 
structural economic policies. 
Unfortunately, policy makers have not exhibited a 
great appetite for dealing with structural measures. 
The lack of political will has reﬂ  ected the notion 
that the political cost of dealing with structural 
issues is incurred up front whereas the beneﬁ  ts are 
widely spread in the distant future. The process 
of globalisation and, in particular, globalisation 
of capital markets, reduces signiﬁ  cantly the force 
of this argument. In a well functioning capital 
market, current prices and rates of return reﬂ  ect ARTICLES
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the expectations of market participants about the 
future course of policies and events. Therefore, in 
a fundamental sense, one of the important roles of 
capital markets is to bring the future “closer” to the 
present. In a sense, under these circumstances, the 
“long run” is much closer to the “short run” than what 
it used to be. As it were, we are in a “fast forward” 
mode. Politicians, therefore, are now more likely to 
see the beneﬁ  ts of the structural measures during 
their own term in ofﬁ  ce and, as a result, some of the 
obstacles for the implementation of such policies are 
diminished. This is one of the important beneﬁ  ts of 
globalisation of capital markets and, thereby, also 
one of the main arguments for putting structural 
measures that enhance the ﬂ  exibility of the economic 
systems high on the economic policy agenda. 
The growing role that capital markets play in 
the modern economic system and the increased 
integration among national capital markets has 
shifted the policy attention toward securing ﬁ  nancial 
stability. During the past few years, it has become 
clear that the traditional policy objective of securing 
price stability needs to be augmented by an additional 
policy objective: securing ﬁ  nancial stability. After 
all, it is the weaknesses in the ﬁ  nancial system that 
has been at the center of recent economic crises. 
As a result, much more attention is now given to 
the structure of the balance sheets of banks and 
ﬁ  nancial institutions, to the role of transparency, as 
well as to the design of regulatory, supervisory and 
prudential systems. 
There is a wise Chinese proverb stating that “the 
honey is sweet but the bee stings”. The challenge 
is how to beneﬁ  t from the sweetness of the honey 
without being stung. Globalisation and structural 
measures generate the sweet honey but are frequently 
accompanied by some short-term hardships. The 
challenge is to secure the great beneﬁ  ts from the 
openness of markets and from the ﬂ  exibility of the 
economic system while minimizing the hardships 
that occasionally arise in the short run following the 
adoption of the structural measures.
While there is a growing consensus that the large 
and growing current account imbalances are not 
sustainable, there does not seem to be the requisite 
urgency to deal effectively with these imbalances. 
To be sure, by the very deﬁ   nition of being 
“non-sustainable”, it is obvious that this process will 
come to a halt. The question, however, is will the 
adjustment be orderly and navigated properly by 
the appropriate policy measures, or will the markets 
lose patience with the lack of policy response and 
respond abruptly and generate great disruptions. 
One of the reasons for the unsatisfactory policy 
response is that previous forecasts have not 
materialized and, thereby, have reduced the 
credibility of the economic analysis. For example, 
we were told that the large budget deﬁ  cit in the 
United States will result in a higher long-term real 
rate of interest. In fact, the long-term rate of interest 
declined and stayed low (the famous Greenspan 
conundrum). We were told that the large and growing 
current account deﬁ  cit of the United States will 
result in a depreciation of the value of the US dollar.
In fact, the dollar has strengthened. We were 
told that a sustained rise in the price of oil will 
result in higher inﬂ  ation as well as in a slowdown 
of economic growth. In fact, inﬂ   ation has not 
accelerated, economic growth seems to be robust, 
and the unemployment rate is on the decline.
We were told that when the Federal Reserve adopts 
a strategy of raising the short-term rate of interest in 
a systematic manner, eventually the long-term rate
will follow suit. In fact, the Federal Reserve has raised 
interest rates ﬁ  fteen consecutive times with very 
little response on the long-term rate and, thereby, 
resulting in a ﬂ   at and even negatively sloped 
yield curve. These and similar phenomena have 
undercut some of the credibility of the conventional 
economic analysis, have raised the possibility of a 
paradigm change, and may have contributed to the 
relative sanguine attitude. It would be a risky policy
gamble to assume that because the predicted 
consequences of deﬁ   cits and policies have not 
yet materialized, the various imbalances can be 
sustainable much longer. 
Waiting for economic and ﬁ  nancial crises would be 
an expensive way to sort out the various puzzles. 
It would be the wrong way. The analysis of crisis 
is typically divided into two: crisis prevention and 
crisis resolution. There is a professional consensus 
that the prevention of a crisis is the less costly 
alternative. To be successful, the well known policy 
package must be in place. It includes a solid ﬁ  scal 
system with low budget deﬁ  cit and non-distorting 
taxes, price stability, a solid banking and ﬁ  nancial 
system, a well functioning capital market, a well 
functioning foreign exchange market, and the 
appropriate institutions and regulations that secure ARTICLES
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the attainment of the above. If, however, a crisis 
does erupt it is extremely important that it is dealt 
with effectively and promptly. The appropriate 
management and resolution of the crisis entails 
a complex set of policies about which I will not 
elaborate in these remarks. However, one important 
principle needs to be highlighted: in resolving a crisis 
one needs to be extremely careful not to sow the 
seed for the next crisis. Consequently, one should 
be very careful to resist the temptation of engaging 
in a wholesale bailout operation without paying due 
attention to the short-term and long-term budgetary 
consequences of the bailout operations and without 
paying due attention to the “moral hazard” that results 
from such operations and that may distort future 
patterns of risk taking. Accordingly, the criteria for 
assessing the success or failure of a speciﬁ  c crisis 
resolution should not just be in terms of the success 
in “extinguishing the ﬁ  re” but rather in the success in 
preventing the next ﬁ  re. These considerations have 
profound indications to the choice of the optimal 
degree of regulation. A system that is over-regulated 
can be as bad as a system that is under-regulated. 
The various crises that took place during the past 
decade have been costly, but I believe it is fair 
to say that the world ﬁ   nancial system and, in 
particular, the banking and ﬁ  nancial systems in 
emerging economies are now much stronger than 
what they used to be. International reserve holdings 
have been rebuilt (and in some cases maybe even 
excessively so), capital markets have been improved, 
supervisory and regulatory systems are more 
solid than what they used to be, foreign exchange 
markets are deeper and more resilient, and there 
is a widespread understanding that it is a mistake 
(and even futile) to engage in massive foreign 
exchange interventions with an aim to cling to the 
wrong exchange rate and prevent the manifestation 
of market forces. In fact, the adoption of ﬂ  exible 
exchange rates has proven to be effective in reducing 
the likelihood of future crises. It has also contributed 
to the recognition that a successful functioning of 
the foreign exchange market requires building the 
appropriate infrastructure. 
Let me conclude with one ﬁ  nal thought. Before the 
onset of the Asian ﬁ  nancial crisis in 1997, the IMF has 
almost completed the preparation for the adoption 
of a new amendment to its Articles of Agreement. 
This amendment was to require the membership 
to adopt (with some conditions) convertibility of 
capital account transactions in an analogous way 
in which members, under the current Articles of 
Agreement, are expected to adopt convertibility for 
transactions in the trade account. This proposed 
amendment reﬂ  ected the belief that with a growing 
degree of globalisation and with the advances in 
capital markets, the world economic system would 
beneﬁ  t from free movement of capital which, in 
turn, necessitates convertibility of capital account 
transactions. The eruption of the Asian ﬁ  nancial 
crisis has derailed the planned adoption of the 
amendment to the Articles of Agreement, and 
reopened the debate on the virtues of globalisation, 
as well as on the preconditions that need to be in 
place for a “safe opening” of the capital account. In 
view of the policy lessons that have been learned, 
and in view of the fact that the world ﬁ  nancial 
system (including that in emerging economies) is 
much stronger than what it used to be, I believe 
that the time has come for the reopening of the 
discussion that would lead towards capital account 
convertibility and that would necessitate the 
adoption of the relevant amendment to the Articles 
of Agreement of the IMF.